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ABSTRACT  
Purpose - This study investigates the impact of board characteristics on the financial 
performance of listed firms in Tanzania. Board characteristics, including outside 
directors, board size, CEO/ Chair duality, gender diversity, board skill and foreign 
directors are addressed in the Tanzanian context by applying two corporate governance 
theories: namely, agency theory; and resource dependence theory.   
Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses balanced panel data regression 
analysis on 80 firm-years observations (2006-2013) from annual reports and semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 12 key stakeholders. The study uses also a 
mixed methods approach and applies a convergent parallel design (Creswell, 2011) to 
integrate quantitative and qualitative data.  
Findings - It was found that in terms of agency theory, while the findings support the 
separation of CEO/Chairperson roles; they do not support outside directors-financial 
performance linkage. With regard to resource dependence theory, the findings suggest 
that gender diversity has a positive impact on financial performance. Furthermore, the 
findings do not support an association between financial performance and board size, 
PhD qualification, and foreign directors. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications - The study contributes to the understanding 
of board-performance link and provides academic evidence to policy makers in 
Tanzania for current and future governance reforms.  
Originality/value - The findings contribute to the literature by providing new and 
original insights that, within a developing setting, extend current understanding of the 
association between corporate governance and financial performance. This is 
predicated, also, on the use of uncommon mixed methods approach.  
Keywords Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Board Characteristics, Firm 
Performance, Tanzania 
Paper type Research Paper 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has a significant impact on the economy since it ensures returns 
to investors by minimising associated investment risks and, hence, contributes to 
companies’ performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Boards of directors play a 
fundamental role in strengthening corporate governance by accomplishing the 
important roles of monitoring and advising on the provision of resources (Tricker, 
2012; Ntim, 2015).  
 
Corporate governance has attracted a multitude of studies to examine the relationship 
between board characteristics and financial performance (Ntim, 2015). However, these 
studies relate to more widely researched developed countries and cannot be generalised 
to other countries due to the differences in corporate governance structures and cultures 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Tricker, 2012; Arora and Sharma, 2016). In their paper, 
Kang et al. (2007) call for a country-specific corporate governance-performance study 
to be conducted. Despite this call, there is still a dearth of corporate governance 
literature in most emerging economies (Ntim, 2015; Darko et al., 2016).  
 
Tanzania, as an emerging economy located in Sub-Saharan Africa, has possibly a 
unique corporate governance environment when compared to developed economies. 
For example, its stock market, the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE), is one of the 
smallest capital markets in the world (Ntim, 2012). Moreover, due to socialism, the 
country’s economy is still suffering from a considerable failure of its state-owned 
enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s (Fulgence, 2014). There are, also, weak legal and 
regulatory controls (Fulgence, 2014). Tanzania has been pursuing economic reforms 
since the mid-1980s. Major corporate governance-related reforms include the 
enactment of the Capital Markets and Securities Act (1994) and the establishment of 
the Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA) in 1995. Also, DSE was 
incorporated in 1996. Moreover, in 2002, the Company Act was enacted and the 
CMSA’s corporate governance guidelines were developed to improve Tanzania’s 
corporate governance. Most of these corporate governance laws and guidelines were 
adopted from developed economies. Since these reforms, very few corporate 
governance studies have been done in Tanzania (Fulgence, 2014), possibly due to the 
lack of interest and awareness of the country’s corporate governance. Therefore, it is 
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worthwhile to use Tanzania as a case study in examining the relationship between board 
characteristics and financial performance.  
 
The study aims to provide insights to answering the following central question: do 
board characteristics have an impact on the financial performance of the Tanzanian 
firms? In order to answer this question, the study applies the mixed method approach 
to investigate the impact of the following board aspects: namely, outside directors, 
board size, CEO duality, gender diversity and foreign directors on a firm’s financial 
performance. These aspects are believed to be essential since the board of directors 
plays a major role in enhancing sound corporate governance of listed firms (Ujunwa, 
2012). Furthermore, CMSA’s guidelines (2002) outline these aspects as being 
important for sound corporate governance practices in the Tanzanian context.  
 
Since very little is known about corporate governance in Tanzania, our study 
contributes further to the understanding of the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance by using Tanzanian data. Also, the study 
addresses the endogeneity challenges by taking into account the endogenous 
relationships between board characteristics and financial performance. Furthermore, 
the application of the uncommon mixed methods approach may provide more insight 
into the research question (Bentahar and Cameron, 2015). The rest of the study 
comprises a literature review and hypotheses development, methodology, empirical 
findings, discussion and the conclusion. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
No single theory explains the general pattern of links between the characteristics of 
boards of directors and firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Jackling and Johl, 
2009). The study of corporate governance and performance relationship are based on 
various conflicting theoretical perspectives such as agency theory, stewardship theory, 
resource dependence theory, institution theory and managerial theory. It is argued that 
these conflicting theories have resulted in inconsistent empirical findings on the 
corporate governance-performance relationship (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
Nonetheless, the previous studies on the relationship between board characteristics and 
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financial performance based their arguments usually on agency and resource 
dependence theories (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Ujunwa, 2012; Ntim, 2015).  
Agency theory assumes that separation of ownership and control can result in a conflict 
of interest between management and shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) since executives are self-interested and opportunist and have 
dissimilar objectives and risk preferences (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency theorists 
believe that a board’s primary responsibility is to monitor executives in order to protect 
the shareholders from conflict of interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  It is argued that 
board of directors is an essential mechanism in monitoring and controlling executives 
from pursuing their own interests at the expense of shareholders’ wealth (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Darko et al., 2016). The Agency theory recommends a large number of 
independent outside directors on board and separation of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and Chairperson of the Board (COB) roles in order to enhance the board’s 
independence and to discharge its oversight role effectively (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). 
From resource dependence theory viewpoint, an organisation is not self-sustainable due 
to limited resources and has to link with the external environment in order to flourish 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The resource dependence theory argues that the board of 
directors is the cornerstone to the organisation’s external environment since it can tap 
into the essential external resources such as financial and human capital, technology 
and relevant information (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). These resources can improve the 
effectiveness of the firm’s strategic decision-making (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Arora 
and Sharma, 2016) and can increase its legitimacy (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Resource 
dependence theory favours large board size, presence of women, skilled and foreign 
directors on board in order to make connections with the firm’s external environment 
(Ujunwa, 2012; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013).  
 
This study is premised on agency and resource dependence theories. These theories 
argue that board characteristics may have a significant impact on the firm’s financial 
performance (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Ujunwa, 2012). Additionally, both agency and 
resource dependence theories can explain the boards’ key functions of monitoring, 
advising and the provision of resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Ntim, 2015). The 
assumptions, related to agency and resource dependence theories, aim at increasing the 
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board effectiveness and are most applicable in an environment where there is an 
inefficient regulatory system (Udayasankar et al., 2005). For instance, most Sub-
Saharan Africa countries including Tanzania are claimed to have a weak regulatory 
system (Tsamenyi et al., 2007).   
The literature review addresses each of this aspect of corporate governance regarding 
the financial performance. Furthermore, the literature review and this section’s 
development of hypotheses is within the context of agency and resource dependence 
theories.  
Outside Directors  
Outside directors can be independent when they do not have any affiliation that affects 
the independence of their decision-making (Tricker, 2012). Theoretically, it is argued 
from agency perspectives that a large proportion of outside directors on the board 
enhances board independence and safeguards owners’ resources from management 
conflicts of interest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless, different studies have 
provided mixed findings of the outside directors’ impact on firms’ financial 
performance. For example, Bhagat and Bolton (2013) and Malik and Makhdoom 
(2016) found that independent directors have a positive impact on the firm’s financial 
performance. Conversely, Kumar and Singh (2012) and Arora and Sharma (2016) 
found that there were negative relationships between outside directors and firms’ 
financial performance. However, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Rodriguez-Fernandez et 
al. (2014) and Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) did not find any relationship between 
outside directors and firm performance. The CMSA’s guidelines (2002), stipulate that 
a board should comprise of at least one-third independent non-executive directors. 
Proponents of agency theory argue that a large proportion of outside directors can 
provide effective monitoring of the firm’s executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jackling 
and Johl, 2009). Henceforth, based on agency theory, the first hypothesis is: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance. 
CEO Duality 
CEO duality may be defined as the joint roles of the CEO and COB being carried out 
by one person. CEO duality has been blamed for the inefficiency of the boards of 
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collapsed giant US companies such as Enron and WorldCom (Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
Agency theorists argue that CEO duality can entice the CEO to lead the board in favour 
of executives such as providing the board with limited information about a firm 
(Ujunwa, 2012). Agency theory recommends the separation of the role of the CEO and 
COB in order to enhance effective monitoring of the board and to avoid CEO 
entrenchment (Mahadeo et al., 2012)  
Empirical evidence on the impact of CEO duality on the firm’s financial performance 
reflects the on-going theoretical opposition. For instance, agency theory was supported 
by the following studies (e.g. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006; Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Ujunwa, 2012); these all found a negative relationship between CEO duality and 
the firm’s financial performance. Conversely, other studies, for example, Donaldson 
and Davis (1991), found a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. (2014) and Arora 
and Sharma (2016), did not find any relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. The CMSA’s guidelines (2002) stipulate that the role and responsibilities 
of COB and CEO should be separated. Consequently, this paper takes the agency theory 
view that CEO duality can enhance CEO entrenchment, impair board independence 
and, hence, make the board less effective in its monitoring role (Ujunwa, 2012). We, 
therefore, hypothesise that: 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and Tanzanian listed firms’ 
financial performance. 
Board Size 
Resource dependence perspectives favour a large board since it can enhance 
connections between a firm and external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; 
Guest, 2009; Tricker, 2012; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). However, from a decision-
making perspective, small boards are suggested since they can enhance effective 
decision-making (Yermack, 1996). There has been some empirical evidence, which 
supports the argument that an increase in board size has a positive impact on firm 
financial performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 
2006; Jackling and Johl, 2009). In contrast, other studies found that there is a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009; 
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Afrifa and Tauringana, 2015; Arora and Sharma, 2016; Malik and Makhdoom, 2016). 
Some studies, such as those by Ferrer and Bandelipe (2012) and Garba and Abubakar 
(2014), did not find any link between board size and firm financial performance. The 
CMSA’s guidelines (2002) recommend that boards should provide wider expertise and 
skills to improve their effectiveness. Based on resource dependence theory view that 
large board size can provide a firm with greater access to resources, such as expertise 
and capital from the external environment (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The following 
hypothesis is therefore proposed: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board size and Tanzanian listed firms’ 
financial performance.  
Gender Diversity 
It is common to see none or very few women on boards (tokenism) in developing 
countries (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Abdullah et al., 2016). Theoretically, from resource 
dependence theory, it is claimed that women on a board can reassure stakeholders of 
the firm’s diversity; increase its legitimacy; and the connection with its external 
environment (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Furthermore, agency theory proponents argue 
that female directors can play a big role in minimising agency costs since they can bring 
new insights to boards and make complex decisions (Carter et al., 2003).  
 
There is mixed empirical evidence on the female directors’ impact on firm financial 
performance. For example, Mahadeo et al. (2012), Lückerath-Rovers (2013), Ntim 
(2015) and Abdullah et al. (2016) found a positive relationship between the proportion 
of women on boards and firm performance. Conversely, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) 
found a negative relationship, and Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009) did not find 
any link between the ratio of women on boards and firm performance. The CMSA’s 
guidelines (2002) recommend that the process of directors’ appointment should be 
sensitive to gender representation. Based on the resource dependence theories view that 
women on boards can enhance the firm’s legitimacy and can provide more connections 
with the external environment (Carter et al., 2003). Accordingly the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4: Women on boards improve Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance  
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Board Skill 
Knowledge and skills can enhance directors’ critical thinking that is essential in 
discharging their main roles of monitoring, advisory and providing important resources 
(Tricker, 2012). Resource dependence theory argues that a board of director’s linkage 
with the external environment can bring diverse skills and knowledge to the firm 
(Francis et al., 2015).  
 
Some corporate governance studies, such as by Ujunwa (2012) and Francis et al. 
(2015), found that board skill could have a positive influence on firm performance. In 
contrast, Van-Ness et al. (2010) found a negative relationship between board skill and 
firm performance, while Kim and Rasheed (2014) did not find any board skill-
performance linkage. The CMSA’s guidelines (2002) encourage the board members 
with appropriate skills for discharging their roles. Therefore, based on the resource 
dependence theory argument that directors bring expertise to the board (Francis et al., 
2015), the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H5: The number of directors with doctoral qualifications is positively associated with 
Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance. 
 
Foreign Directors 
Foreign investors are likely to hire foreign directors to protect their interests abroad 
(Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). Resource dependence theory proponents assert that 
foreign directors can bring a range of experiences, cultural differences, and skills from 
other countries to a board and, hence, can bring new outlooks and problem-solving 
capabilities (Ujunwa, 2012).  
 
There is, also, mixed empirical evidence on the foreign directors’ impact on firm 
financial performance. Ujunwa (2012) found that foreign directors could have a 
positive influence on performance. Other studies, such as those by Jhunjhunwala and 
Mishra (2012), found an insignificant positive relationship. Therefore, based on the 
argument of proponents of resource dependence theory that foreign directors can 
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provide the board with connections to foreign networks and capital (Ujunwa, 2012), we 
hypothesise that:  
H6: Foreign directors are positively associated with Tanzanian listed firms’ financial 
performance. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the study applied the uncommon mixed 
methods approach in the form of a convergent parallel design (Creswell, 2011). Mixed 
methods approach is a research methodology that includes the collection, analysis and 
mixing of quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell, 2011). This approach enriches 
the validity and reliability of the study’s findings (Bentahar and Cameron, 2015). 
Furthermore, it provides a broader insight to answering the research question (Johnson 
et al., 2007). Finally, the use of semi-structured interviews can provide practical based 
solutions to answering the research question (Bryman, 2016). 
 
In line with previous studies, such as Ferrer and Banderlipe (2012), this study gives 
more priority to the quantitative findings since the quantitative approach is argued to 
be more appropriate in determining the cause and effect relationship (Bryman, 2016). 
Numerous corporate governance studies, such as Jackling and Johl (2009) and Ujunwa 
(2012), used the quantitative approach to examine the relationship between aspects of 
board characteristics and financial performance. We used qualitative findings to 
complement the quantitative findings and to increase the study’s validity and 
substantiate the findings (Johnson et al., 2007; Ferrer and Banderlipe, 2012). In line 
with Ferrer and Banderlipe (2012), the quantitative and qualitative findings are brought 
together in this study’s results and discussion sub-section in order to provide a broader 
insight (Creswell, 2011). 
 
Qualitatively and consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib’s (2007) research, we employed 
the semi-structured interviews method. This method is argued to be more flexible and 
compatible with other methods of data analysis (Bryman, 2016). Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 12 key stakeholders in corporate governance. In line 
with Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), we targeted members of the boards of Tanzanian listed 
companies, regulators and other stakeholders as this study’s participants because of 
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their rich knowledge and experience of corporate governance. This enhanced their 
effective participation in the interviews. The selection of participants was based on 
judgmental and snowball sampling. Judgemental sampling increases the quality of the 
data by selecting intentionally the knowledgeable and skilled participants (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007). Snowball sampling helps us to gain more participants who are 
connected with initially selected participants (Bryman, 2016). The selected participants 
were nine board members (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8 and B9) from nine different 
Tanzanian listed firms, Regulators (senior officers) from CMSA and DSE (R1, R2), 
and a senior officer from Institute of Directors (R3). In conducting interviews, the study 
took account of ethical procedures in order to safeguard the interests, privacy, and 
dignity of the participants (Bryman, 2016)  
 
We developed an interview guide framework based on the research questions (Bryman 
and Bell, 2015) (see Appendix 1). Similar to previous studies on corporate governance 
(for example, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) and in order to make sense of collected data, 
this study applied a thematic analysis approach (Boyatzis, 1998). The thematic analysis 
identifies, analyses, and reports patterns (themes) within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
The approach can be applied to different theoretical perspectives and is a useful 
research tool that, potentially, can provide a rich and detailed account of data (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). In this study, 7 themes were developed based on the previous studies 
on corporate governance literature and the research questions (Boyatzis, 1998). These 
were board size, outside directors, CEO duality, foreign directors, gender diversity, 
board skill and board effectiveness.  
 
Quantitatively, data were collected from the OSIRIS financial database and from the 
annual reports of firms listed on the DSE. This study used the census approach and, 
thus, the sampling frame consisted of all 18 firms listed on the DSE at the end of 2013. 
Six firms, which belonged to the financial services industry, were excluded from the 
population due to the special regulatory environment in which they operated (Jackling 
and Johl, 2009).  
Moreover, to balance a panel, five other firms were excluded from the sample because 
they did not have complete records of all data needed to measure the study’s variables 
within the period 2006-2013. The use of balanced panel data minimises the risk of 
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endogeneity and multicollinearity (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Darko et al., 2016). 
Consequently, the final sample consisted of the remaining 10 Tanzanian firms listed on 
the DSE from 2006 to 2013 and produced a total sample of 80 observations over the 
period. This study’s sample size is comparatively larger than some other corporate 
governance studies in developing countries (e.g. Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Weekes-
Marshall, 2014).  We chose to start in 2006 since the Tanzania Company Act 2002 
came into force officially in 2006 and, from this time, Tanzanian listed firms started to 
comply effectively with the Act’s requirements. Furthermore, it is believed that already 
in 2006 most Tanzanian listed firms had implemented the IFRSs effectively after they 
were introduced officially to Tanzania in 2004. Since the data were collected between 
January and March 2015, the sample ends in 2013 because this is the most recent year 
for which data were available.  
 
Table 1 describes variables that are applied in this study. We use the following model 
to analyse the relationship between board characteristics and firm’s financial 
performance (Guest, 2009; Ujunwa, 2012; Mouselli and Hussainey, 2014): 
 
Yit = α +β1BSIZEit + β2OUTSIDEit + β3CEODit + Β4FODIRit+ β5EDIVit + β6FEMDIRit 
+ +Β7FDEBTit + β8FMSIZEit + β9FMAGEit + εit 
 
Where 
 Yit is alternatively ROAit and ROEit for ith firm at time t. 
 α is the intercept, βi is the regression coefficient of ith firm and εit is the 
composite error term.  
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Table 1: Data variables 
Variable  Acronym Description 
Independent 
Variables: 
  
Outside directors  BOUTSIDE The number of outside non-executive directors 
as a percentage or a proportion of the total 
number of directors on the board. 
Board size  BSIZE The number of members who comprise the 
board of directors at the end of a financial 
year. 
 
CEO duality  CEOD The practice, whereby a single individual is 
serving as both Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and board chair. It is measured by assigning 1 
if CEO is not the chair and 0 if CEO is also the 
chair. 
Gender diversity 
 
 
FEMDIR The numbers of female directors as a 
percentage of the total number of directors on 
the board. 
Board skill 
 
BSKILL Competency and capabilities of the board 
members measured as the proportion of 
directors with a doctoral qualification to the 
total number of directors. 
 
Foreign Directors 
 
FODIR The proportion of foreign directors to the total 
number of directors 
 
Dependent 
Variables: 
  
Return on assets  
 
ROA Net income divided by total assets.  
Return on equity  
 
ROE Net Income divided by shareholders’ equity. 
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Control 
variables: 
  
 
Firm debt  
 
FDEBT Financial leverage (total debt divided by total 
equity) 
Firm size  
 
FMSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
Firm age  FMAGE Natural logarithm of the number of years which 
the firm has been listed on the Dar es Salaam 
Stock Exchange (DSE) 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents a descriptive statistics summary of board characteristics, firm 
characteristics, and financial performance. The average number of outside directors in 
the sample is 82%. This demonstrates the high rate of compliance with CMSA 
guidelines (2002) and suggests that a board should comprise of at least one-third of 
outside directors. The board size is between 5 and 12 and the mean value is 8; this is 
consistent with Ujunwa’s (2012) findings. The maximum, minimum and mean values 
of CEO duality are 0, 100% and 90% respectively. This denotes that 90% of the 
sampled listed companies comply with the CMSA guidelines (2002) to separate the role 
of the CEO and COB. Table 2 shows that the board members with doctorate 
qualifications and female directors both average 9% of each firm’s board of directors.  
 
In terms of foreign directors, the average number of foreign directors of the sampled 
firms is 61%. The average firm size and age in natural log of assets is 7.42 and 0.74 
respectively. The total firm leverage ranges between 0.23 and 6.6 of total assets, and 
the average of the sampled firms is 1.55. This indicates that most Tanzanian listed firms 
are by far financed by debt than equity financing. Table 2 demonstrates, also, that the 
listed firms are financially steady, as measured by ROA (mean 17%) and ROE (mean 
31%). The widespread use of financial performance measures and other variables, as 
indicated in Table 2, shows that the sampled firms achieved a reasonable variation 
(Ntim, 2013).  
 15 
In line with Field’s (2014) findings, this study addresses significant linear regressions 
assumptions; these relate to fitting a linear model to the data. These are 
multicollinearity, normality, linearity, homogeneity, and autocorrelation and, by using 
tests of Pearson correlations, histograms and normal probability plots of standardised 
residuals and plots of standardised residuals against standardised predicted values, 
Durbin-Watson of the variables. These results (available upon request) indicate that the 
assumptions have been reasonably met. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of model variables for all (80) firm years 
 
No. of 
observation Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Firm Debt (FDEBT) 80 0.23 6.60 1.55 1.66 
Firm Size (ln) (FMSIZE) 80 5.22 8.47 7.42 0.78 
Firm Age (ln) (FMAGE) 80 0.00 1.18 0.74 0.33 
Return on Asset (%) (ROA) 80 -8 47 17 14 
Return on Equity (%) (ROE) 80 -47 95 31 25 
Board Size (BSIZE) 80 5 12 7.71 2.26 
Outside Directors (BOUTSIDE) (%) 80 38 100 82 17 
CEO Duality (CEOD) 80 0 1 0.90 0.30 
Foreign Directors (FODIR) (%) 80 0 100 61 29 
Board Skill (BSKILL) (%) 80 0 29 9 9 
Gender Diversity (FEMDIR) (%) 80 0 36 9 10 
 
 
Correlation Results 
 
Table 3 presents correlation matrixes for the variables under investigation. ROA is 
negatively correlated with CEO duality and firm debt and is positively correlated with 
gender diversity. ROE is positively correlated with gender diversity and board skill and 
marginally negatively correlated with CEO duality. CEO duality is correlated positively 
with outside directors and board skill. The possible explanation for this finding is that 
there is a reduction in financial performance when there is CEO duality (Ujunwa, 
2012). It can be interpreted that the number of women on the board tends to mitigate 
the risk caused by debt. In line with Mahadeo et al.’s (2012) findings, gender diversity 
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is associated, also, significantly and positively with numbers of directors with doctoral 
qualifications. There is a significant and positive correlation with Foreign Directors. 
This is in line with Ujunwa’s (2012) findings and indicates that an increase in board 
size results, also, in an increase in the proportion of foreign directors. This is due to the 
fact that foreign investors own most Tanzanian listed firms. Table 3 shows, also, that 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are below 10. Multicollinearity can be 
detected by VIF and a value of 10 or above indicates multicollinearity problem (Field, 
2014). 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of the Variables for all (80) Firm Years 
 
 Significant at the 5% level (2 tailed). ** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
 
Regression Results and Discussion 
Table 4 below summarises the estimation results for OLS when using ROA and ROE 
as the dependent variables. As Table 4 indicates, CEOD, BSIZE, FSIZE, FDEBT and 
FMAGE exhibited negative coefficients, while other variables exhibited positive 
coefficients.  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1 FDEBT 1 
          
1.368 
2 FMSIZE -0.043 1 
         
1.959 
  0.702 
          
  
3 FMAGE 0.012 -0.195 1 
        
2.208 
  0.919 0.083 
         
  
4 ROA -.524** -0.012 -0.133 1 
       
  
  0.000 0.914 0.240 
        
  
5 ROE -0.078 -0.098 -0.111 .821** 1 
      
  
  0.490 0.386 0.325 0.000 
       
  
6 BSIZE .262* -0.196 -0.012 -0.169 0.053 1 
     
2.038 
  0.019 0.081 0.916 0.134 0.642 
      
  
7 BOUTSIDE .307** -.314** -.304** -0.185 -0.028 0.058 1 
    
3.887 
  0.006 0.005 0.006 0.100 0.803 0.607 
     
  
8 CEOD 0.218 -.318** -.222* -.337** -0.205 0.106 .774** 1 
   
2.640 
  0.052 0.004 0.047 0.002 0.069 0.351 0.000 
    
  
9 FODIR .224* .424** -.544** -0.016 0.078 .463** -0.016 0.006 1 
  
4.100 
  0.046 0.000 0.000 0.885 0.490 0.000 0.891 0.959 
   
  
10 BSKILL 0.108 0.169 -.264* 0.168 .262* 0.148 .388** .254* .384** 1 
 
2.246 
  0.340 0.134 0.018 0.137 0.019 0.191 0.000 0.023 0.000 
  
  
11 FEMDIR -0.202 -0.077 0.105 .383** .409** 0.031 -0.125 -0.182 0.120 .342** 1 1.586 
  0.073 0.497 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.787 0.270 0.105 0.290 0.002     
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Table 4: OLS Regression Results 
 
ROA ROE 
 
 
B T Sign B T Sign VIF 
(Constant) 0.733 3.282 0.002*** 1.101 2.326 0.023** 
 
BSIZE -0.012 -1.590 0.116 -0.007 -0.442 0.660 2.038 
BOUTSIDE 0.139 1.005 0.319 0.202 0.690 0.492 3.887 
CEOD -0.225 -3.533 0.001*** -0.348 -2.581 0.012** 2.640 
FODIR 0.095 1.149 0.254 0.112 0.638 0.526 4.100 
BSKILL 0.286 1.520 0.133 0.516 1.291 0.201 2.246 
FEMDIR 0.256 1.688 0.096 0.737 2.293 0.025** 1.586 
FDEBT -0.039 -4.741 0.000*** -0.002 -0.128 0.899 1.368 
FSIZE -0.053 -2.496 0.015** -0.094 -2.091 0.040** 1.959 
FMAGE -0.045 -0.859 0.393 -0.097 -0.875 0.384 2.208 
R2 
 
51.70% 
 
  30.10% 
  
Adjusted R2 
 
45.50% 
 
 21.20% 
  
F-Statistics 
 
8.332*** 
 
 3.356*** 
  
No. Of Observations 
 
80 
 
  80 
  
*** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed).  
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Outside directors  
As indicated in Table 4, the findings show an insignificant relationship and, hence, the 
first hypothesis H1 is rejected. The findings are similar with those of prior findings of 
Bhagat and Black (2002), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Ferrer and Banderlipe (2012), 
and Afrifa and Tauringana (2015). However, the findings are inconsistent with 
CMSA’s guidelines (2002) and Bhagat and Bolton’s (2013) and Malik and 
Makhdoom’s (2016) previous studies. The findings do not support the argument of the 
agency theory that a large proportion of independent outside directors is essential for 
the board to either monitor or oversee the firm’s management in order to minimise 
agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jackling and Johl, 2009).  
The results are in line with the argument of Interviewees B2, B6, B9, R1 and R3 that, 
if they are independent and competent, the outside directors can have a positive impact 
on the firm’s financial performance. Lack of independence may contribute to the 
outside directors’ insignificant performance since they may be ineffective in 
monitoring the management (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ferrer and Banderlipe, 2012). 
Consistent with Fulgence (2014), interviewees B2, B3 and R3 argued that, in 
Tanzania, some of the directors might not be independent because the directors’ 
appointment process is not fully transparent.  
 
CEO duality  
The findings (Tables 4) show that there is a significantly negative relationship between 
ROA and ROE and CEO duality. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is accepted. The findings 
are in line with the requirements of CMSA’s guidelines (2002) and the findings of 
previous studies such as Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006), Ujunwa (2012), and Shrivastav and Kalsie (2016). However, the results are 
inconsistent with the earlier work of Donaldson and Davis (1991). The findings, 
support, also, the agency theory recommendations that the roles of CEO and COB 
should be separated since the duality impairs board independence by enhancing CEO 
entrenchment and, hence, reducing financial performance  (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ujunwa, 2012). Similarly, a majority of the interviewees 
(B1, B2, B3, B4, B6, B7, R1, R2 and R3) were of the same view that, in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of the board, the roles of CEO and COB should be separated 
in order to enhance board independence, accountability and transparency.  
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For instance interview B2 argued claimed,  
 
When you have CEO duality I think you loose an important control, because it 
is like being the prosecutor and being the judge in your own case. Which of 
course we know is unacceptable, even if one acts equitably it is difficult to 
convince people that there is an element of fairness. 
(Interviewee B2) 
Board size  
Hypothesis H3 suggests a positive relationship between board size and a firm’s 
financial performance. Firstly, board size shows an insignificant relationship with 
financial performance (see Table 4). Therefore, hypothesis H3 is rejected. The findings 
support previous findings of Ferrer and Banderlipe (2012) and Garba and Abubakar 
(2014). Moreover, the theories of resource dependence, and agency, which favour 
large boards, are not supported (Garba and Abubakar, 2014). However, the findings 
are inconsistent with earlier works of Yermack (1996) and Jackling and Johl (2009). 
The results are consistent with the interviewees’ views that board size itself cannot 
guarantee financial performance (B2, B5, B9, R1 and R2). In line with Kim and 
Rasheed (2014); they argued that a diversity of members with different expertise 
matters more. The results suggest that lack of mixed skills of expertise may render a 
board to be ineffective.  
 
Gender diversity  
As indicated in Table 4, the findings show a significant positive relationship between 
gender diversity and ROE and a marginally significant one with ROA. Thus, the first 
hypothesis H4 is accepted. The findings support prior studies of Mahadeo et al. (2012) 
Lückerath-Rovers (2013), Ntim (2015), and Abdullah et al. (2016) which also indicate 
that gender diversity is positively related with firm performance. Nevertheless, the 
results are inconsistent with Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy’s (2009) and Ahern and 
Dittmar’s (2012) earlier works. Theoretically, the findings support the resource 
dependence theory argument that women on boards can enhance a firm’s connections 
with the outside environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Carter et al, 2003). Also, it 
supports the agency theory that women on boards are argued to be more risk-averse 
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than men (Levi et al., 2013), especially when making investment decisions such as 
mergers and acquisitions (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Levi et al., 2013). The firms with 
women on the boards have lower liabilities (risks) (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). This 
could be one of the possible explanations on why they have a higher ROE. 
 
Furthermore, the interviewees’ insights reflected, also, the different findings.  Some 
of the interviewees (B1, R3, B5 and R2) supported the presence of women on boards 
by arguing that women had different decision-making skills; were trustworthy; and 
were committed to the organisation.  Interviewees B2, B6, R1, B7, B9 B4, B3 argued 
that the quality and output of the board members were most likely to be linked to a 
firm’s financial performance. Interviewee R2 said, 
 
If women have the relevant qualifications, experiences, and competencies, I do 
believe that they can do wonders, even more than men... Most of the time they 
can make hard decisions, when they understand something and their conscience 
tells them it is the right thing they are doing, they are able to pursue it. 
 (Interviewee R2). 
 
Board Skill  
There is an insignificant relationship between the proportion of directors with doctoral 
qualifications and financial performance (see Table 4). Consequently, hypothesis H5, 
which predicts a positive relationship between board skill and financial performance, 
is rejected. The results are in line with the previous findings of Jhunjhunwala and 
Mishra (2012) and Kim and Rasheed (2014) and not consistent with those of Ujunwa 
(2012) and Francis et al. (2015). The findings do not support the argument from 
resource dependence that directors can bring to the board knowledge and skills that 
are essential for monitoring, advising and decision-making (Jhunjhunwala and Mishra, 
2012; Kim and Rasheed, 2014). In this regard, interviewee B3 argued,  
 
The appointment of directors is not being done transparently; people are not 
being appointed the board on their respective merit. A director should be 
appointed to a board knowing that there is a certain contribution that he/she is 
required to make. 
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(Interviewee B3) 
Some of the interviewees asserted that some Tanzanian firms appointed academic 
directors, such as professors, to their boards in order to increase status (B4, B5 and 
B6). This might result in ineffective highly educated directors. 
 
Foreign directors 
Hypothesis H6 predicts a positive relationship between foreign directors and financial 
performance. However, the findings (see Table 4) indicate that there is no link between 
the proportion of foreign directors and the firm’s financial performance. 
Consequently, the hypothesis is rejected. The insignificant of foreign directors 
variable, although not consistent with Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) and Masulis 
(2012), is consistent with prior findings of Jhunjhunwala and Mishra (2012). 
Inconsistent with resource dependence and agency theories, the findings do not 
support Ujunwa’s (2012) argument that foreign directors minimise agency problems 
and provide access to foreign capital, contacts, networks and expertise. The results are 
in line with some interviewees’ views that a director’s nationality does not have a 
significant influence on financial performance. Interviewees B2, B3, B4, B7, B8 and 
R2 claimed that competency mattered more than the directors’ nationalities since some 
of their appointments were based on the influence of the foreign owners. 
Consequently, some of the foreign directors may not have an appropriate expertise.   
 
Robustness Analysis 
This subsection addresses the potential endogeneity problems such as non-monotonic 
relationships; these may lead to possibly misleading OLS findings. Endogeneity 
occurs when there is a correlation between independent variables and an error term in 
a statistical model (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012). Simultaneity and 
omitted variables are among the common causes of endogeneity problems in corporate 
governance research (Ntim et al., 2012). Previous studies argued that a board structure 
was to be determined endogenously (e.g. Bhagat and Black; 2002; Jackling and Johl, 
2009; Ntim, 2015). Similar with Guest (2009) and Ntim (2013). Therefore, we used 
fixed effect regression analysis (see Table 5), to address the likely impact on an 
unobserved firm’s related heterogeneities, such as culture, on both board 
characteristics and financial performance variable. 
 22 
In order to address the issue of omitted variables, this study, in line with previous 
studies, adopted the approaches of instrumental variables through 2SLS (Bhagat and 
Black, 2002; Ntim et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015) and fixed effects regression (Ntim, 2015). 
 
Table 5: Fixed Effect Regression Results 
 ROA ROE 
 B T Sig. B T Sig. 
Constant 0.660 3.042 0.003*** 1.030 2.159 0.034** 
Outside 
directors 
0.174 1.292 0.201 0.265 0.898 0.372 
Board 
size 
-0.010 -1.455 0.150 -0.006 -0.388 0.699 
CEO 
duality 
-0.224 -3.654 0.001*** -0.356 -2.649 0.010** 
Gender 
diversity 
0.254 1.741 0.086 0.726 2.260 0.027** 
Foreign 
directors 
0.117 1.460 0.149 0.140 0.791 0.431 
Board 
skill 
0.225 1.235 0.221 0.478 1.190 0.238 
Firm 
Debt 
-0.044 -5.331 0.000*** -0.012 -0.678 0.500 
Firm age -0.035 -0.691 0.492 -0.078 -0.697 0.488 
Firm size -0.050 -2.416 0.018** -0.093 -2.066 0.043** 
R2  0.549   0.306  
Adjusted 
R2 
 0.491   0.217  
F 
statistics 
 9.476***   3.433***  
N  80   80  
** At 5% level of significance and *** at 1% level of significance respectively 
Similar with Jackling and Johl (2009), this study applied lagged values of explanatory 
variables (LAGBOUTSIDE, LAGBSIZE, LAGCEOD, LAGFEMDIR, LAGBSKILL, 
LAGFODIR, LAGFEDEBT, LAGFMSIZE, LAGFMAGE) and controls variables of 
FDEBT, FMAGE and FMSIZE. In order to ensure the appropriateness of the 2SLS, 
these variables were tested to check whether they correlated with the error term in the 
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model. The findings (Appendix 2) show that there is no association between the IV 
and error term. The uses of lagged values as IV are consistent with Jackling and Johl’s 
(2009) previous corporate governance studies). 
 
Table 6: 2SLS Regression Results 
 ROA ROE 
 B T Sig. B T Sig. 
(Constant) 0.518 1.686 0.096 0.61 0.929 0.356 
Firm Debt  -0.038 -3.802 0.000** -0.002 -0.089 0.929 
Firm Size  -0.032 -1.284 0.204 -0.054 -1.028 0.308 
Firm Age  -0.064 -0.941 0.350 -0.121 -0.83 0.409 
Board Size  -0.008 -0.849 0.399 0.001 0.049 0.961 
Outside Directors  0.285 1.118 0.268 0.576 1.054 0.296 
CEO duality  -0.275 -2.734 0.008** -0.467 -2.172 0.033* 
Foreign Directors  0.062 0.493 0.624 0.08 0.297 0.768 
Board Skill  0.009 0.023 0.982 -0.153 -0.184 0.854 
Gender Diversity  0.35 1.203 0.233 1.017 1.635 0.107 
R2  48.40%   25.50%   
Adjusted R2  41.70%   15.80%   
F Sign  
7.197*
*   2.623*   
No. Of Observations   78     78   
       
       
** At 5% level of significance and *** at 1% level of significance respectively 
 
 
Tables 5 and 6 indicate the results of the fixed effect regressions and 2SLS regressions. 
These results are similar to the OLS results. For example, CEO duality and Firm debt 
relate negatively to financial performance. However, while unrelated to ROA the 2SLS 
results indicate a positive weak link between gender diversity and ROE. Since 
magnitude and direction of both sets of coefficients appear similar, OLS regression 
results are reasonably robust to the endogeneity tests results.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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A board of directors is argued to be a backbone of corporate governance since an 
effective board enhances sound corporate governance. Most of the key corporate 
failures and financial scandals have resulted from agency problems due to ineffective 
boards (Tricker, 2012). Agency theory, the key corporate governance theory argues that 
an effective board of directors is the essential mechanism to minimise agency problems. 
Corporate governance reforms, such as codes of corporate governance, guidelines, and 
regulations, aim to enhance the board’s effectiveness (Ujunwa, 2012). Most of the 
corporate governance studies provide insights about the board and financial 
performance relationship in developed countries whilst there are very few insights 
regarding board characteristics and financial performance relationship in developing 
countries and, especially, in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tsamenyi et al, 2007). In order to 
respond to Kang et al.’s (2007) recommendation, this study examined the impact of 
board characteristics on the Tanzanian listed firms’ financial performance by using 
agency and resource dependence theories. A single theory cannot explain the linkage 
between the firm’s board characteristics and financial performance (Jackling and Johl, 
2009).  
 
The agency theory is partially supported by the finding that CEO duality has a negative 
impact. The findings support, also, resource dependence theory by arguing that gender 
diversity has a positive impact on the financial performance. Moreover, other board 
characteristics of outside directors, board size, foreign directors and board skills have 
no relationship with the firm’s financial performance. It could be argued that lack of 
independence and the right expertise might be among of the reasons for this 
insignificant relationship.  
 
The findings contribute to the understanding of the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance by using, for the first time, Tanzanian data that 
offers new empirical evidence in an emerging country. Furthermore, the study was 
premised on the use of mixed methods methodology, which is the uncommon approach 
in corporate governance research to provide appropriate responses to the research 
questions. By using agency and resource dependence theories, this study explains, also, 
how the integrative multi-theory approach works using Tanzanian data.  
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In terms of practical implications, the study offers essential contributions to 
policymakers. Our findings are in line with those of Kang et al. (2007) and provide 
evidence to Tanzanian policymakers that not all developed countries’ corporate 
governance practices are applicable to developing countries. The firms should adopt 
corporate governance practices that have a significant influence on their financial 
performance. Therefore, in order to improve Tanzania’s corporate governance, it is 
recommended that the country develop corporate governance practices that reflect its 
specific business environment. Moreover, Tanzanian corporate governance institutions 
should improve the openness and transparency of their directors’ appointment 
processes and they should conduct more capacity building training among directors. 
The findings can be used, also, by corporate governance institutions to raise awareness 
of the advantages of the Tanzanian listed firms separating the roles of CEO and COB. 
The findings may suggest, also, a need for Tanzanian corporate governance institutions 
and boards of directors to recognise the importance of a gender-balanced board.  
This study faced the limitations of its quantitative data sample size, although we tried 
to collect data as fully and accurately as possible. Thus, this study’s findings of this 
study may not be applicable to either non-listed and state-owned enterprises or 
organisations outside Tanzania. As mentioned above, the sample size is a challenge in 
many developing countries (Weekes-Marshall, 2014). For further studies, non-listed 
companies and state-owned enterprises should be included in order to increase the 
sample size.  
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